Nova: Ape Genius

Viewable online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/apegenius/program.html

Are animals autistic savants?

A new article published by PLoS Biology explores this question suggested by Temple Grandin.

Vallortigara G, Snyder A, Kaplan G, Bateson P, Clayton NS, et al. (2008) Are Animals Autistic Savants. PLoS Biol 6(2): e42 doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060042

Similarities in behaviour between autistic savants and animals have been suggested, most notably by Temple Grandin [1] in her book Animals in Translation 2005, and this theory seems to have gained some consensus among other neuroscientists who are not specialists in animal cognition. Here we aim to discuss two specific parallels between the behavioural characteristics of animals and those of autistic savants that have been raised in relation to Grandin’s book. Autistic savants show extraordinary skills, particularly in music, mathematics, and drawing. Do animals sometimes show forms of extreme (though, of course, different) cognitive skills confined to particular domains that resemble those shown by autistic savants? We argue that the extraordinary cognitive feats shown by some animal species can be better understood as adaptive specialisations that bear little, if any, relationship to the unusual skills shown by savants. It has also been argued that autistic savants “think in detail”, and that this is the key to their extraordinary skills. Do animals have privileged access to lower level sensory information before it is packaged into concepts, as has been argued for autistic humans, or do they process sensory inputs according to rules that pre-empt or filter what is perceived even at the lowest levels of sensory processing? We argue that animals, like nonautistic humans, process sensory information according to rules, and that this manner of processing is a specialised feature of the left hemisphere of the brain in both humans and nonhuman animals. Hence, we disagree with the claim that animals are similar to autistic savants. However, we discuss the possibility that manipulations that suppress activity of the left hemisphere and enhance control by the right hemisphere shift attention to the details of individual stimuli, as opposed to categories and higher-level concepts, and can thereby make performance more savant-like in both humans and animals. (Editors note: See Box 1 for Grandin’s response.)

SPACKLED 2/20/07 Kacelnik 2006

Kacelnik, A. (2006). Meanings of rationality. In M. Nudds & S. Hurley (eds), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.

Abstract: The concept of rationality differs between psychology, philosophy, economics and biology. For psychologists and philosophers, the emphasis is on the process by which decisions are made: rational beliefs are arrived at by reasoning and contrasted with beliefs arrived at by emotion, faith, authority or arbitrary choice. Economists emphasise consistency of choice, regardless of the process and the goal. Biologists use a concept that links both previous ideas. Following Darwin’s theory of natural selection, they expect animals to behave as if they had been designed to surpass the fitness of their conspecifics and use optimality to predict behaviour that might achieve this. I introduce the terms PP-rationality, E-rationality and B-rationality to refer to these three different conceptions, and explore the advantages and weaknesses of each of them. The concepts are first discussed and then illustrated with specific examples of research in bird behaviour, including New Caledonian crows’ tool design, hummingbirds’ preferences between flowers and starlings’ choices between walking and flying. I conclude that no single definition of rationality can serve the purposes of the research community but that agreement on meanings and justifications for each stand is both necessary and possible.

Points of discussion from the meeting:

The separation of economic and biological rationality – how distinct are they?

How does ecological rationality fit into this 3-part scheme?

How do we deal with the multidimensionality of rationality that takes into account the multiple factors involved that need to be weighed together (e.g. time horizons)?

SPACKLED 2/20/07 Ramsey et al. 2007

Ramsey, G., Bastian, M.L. & van Schaik, C. (2007). Animal innovation defined and operationalized. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 30, 393-437.

Abstract: Innovation is a key component of most definitions of culture and intelligence. Additionally, innovations may affect a species’ ecology and evolution. Nonetheless, conceptual and empirical work on innovation has only recently begun. In particular, largely because the existing operational definition (first occurrence in a population) requires long-term studies of populations, there has been no systematic study of innovation in wild animals. To facilitate such study, we have produced a new definition of innovation: Innovation is the process that generates in an individual a novel learned behavior that is not simply a consequence of social learning or environmental induction. Using this definition, we propose a new operational approach for distinguishing innovations in the field. The operational criteria employ information from the following sources: (1) the behavior’s geographic and local prevalence and individual frequency; (2) properties of the behavior, such as the social role of the behavior, the context in which the behavior is exhibited, and its similarity to other behaviors; (3) changes in the occurrence of the behavior over time; and (4) knowledge of spontaneous or experimentally induced behavior in captivity. These criteria do not require long-term studies at a single site, but information from multiple populations of a species will generally be needed. These criteria are systematized into a dichotomous key that can be used to assess whether a behavior observed in the field is likely to be an innovation.

Points of discussion from the meeting:

• What is the distinction, for the purposes of operationally defining innovation, between ‘learning’ and ‘memory’? In other words, is learning involved in innovation as the authors suggest, or is it more accurately understood as remembering?
• What role does imagination play in innovation?
• How can disadvantageous and/or maladaptive innovations be identified? Since innovations are not necessarily advantageous, it may be important to know more about the rate at which novel behaviors (innovations?) are ‘thrown out’. For example, due to social pressures against them, as in the case of male cowbirds who are attacked by other males if they sing songs that are really potent (though these songs are better characterized as improvisation or imitation of another’s male’s song).
  • This also raises the issue of the importance/role of the social context in the production of innovative behaviors.
• What is the importance of the relationship between imitation and innovation?

Reading for Animal Behavior Discussion Group-Feb. 15

Sensory exploitation as an evolutionary origin to nuptial food gifts in insects

Author: Scott K. Sakaluk 

Source: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON SERIES B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES    Volume: 267    Issue: 1441    Pages:339-343    Published: 2000

Abstract: Nuptial food gifts given by males to females at mating are widespread in insects, but their evolutionary origin remains obscure. Such gifts may arise as a form of sensory trap that exploits the normal gustatory responses of females, favouring the selective retention of sperm of gift-giving males. I tested this hypothesis by offering foreign food gifts, synthesized by males of one cricket species, to females of three non-gift-giving species. Females provisioned with novel food gifts were ‘fooled’ into accepting more sperm than they otherwise would in the absence of a gift. These results support the hypothesis that nuptial food gifts and post-copulatory female mating preferences coevolve through a unique form of sensory exploitation.

Canine Science Forum, Budapest, July 5-9, 2008

http://csf2008.elte.hu/

Latticed Intentions

From endirectional to intentional. Updated: 2008.02.19

latticed-intentions.pdf

Welcome!

Welcome to the Animal Minds Blog! This blog was initially conceived as a forum to continue and expand discussions from cognitive ethology reading groups that are meeting in St. Louis and at Indiana University, Bloomington (SPACKLED). We thought a blog would be an ideal way to develop additional conversations that extend beyond these groups, with the hope of bringing diverse perspectives to one virtual table. We’re open to work from a variety of fields, including Psychology, Biology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Neuroscience, and everything in between (and beyond).

We would love to have as many people involved as possible, so please feel free to encourage friends/colleagues with similar interests to join in discussions. And if anyone finds relevant articles that you’d like to discuss, or if you have any of your own work you want to throw into the ring, please feel free to email the article and/or a synopsis/commentary of it to animalmindsATgmailDOTcom

Please bear with us as we learn the ins and outs of blogging and hopefully we will soon get into the groove of posting regularly.

Katie and Adam